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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
All Australian governments – federal, state and local 
– share a responsibility to make our federal system 
work effectively for the benefit of all Australians.
Over the coming decades, Australia will face significant social, 
economic and environmental challenges. Meeting these 
challenges will require collaboration between governments to 
deliver national solutions that are sustainable over the long 
term. It will also require agreement on a substantive national 
reform agenda aimed at deepening the economic benefits 
gained from the market-inspired and microeconomic reforms 
of the 1980s and 1990s, extending these reforms to include a 
focus on human capital and adopting new reforms in critical 
environmental areas such as water and climate change.
Over the last 18 months, there has been a resurgence of 
interest in taking collaborative national action across a range 
of policy fronts. Australian governments at all levels have 
committed to work together to achieve shared goals and 
improved outcomes. There appears to be a shared commitment 
to move away from the negative ‘blame game’ politics that has 
hampered good policymaking in the past. In place of rivalry, 
there appears to be a growing awareness that real policy 
outcomes are enhanced most effectively when governments 
work together to achieve common objectives.
At the 20 December 2007 Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) meeting, all Australian governments committed to an 
ambitious and wide-ranging national reform agenda. One of 
the most important decisions at the December 2007 COAG 
meeting was the agreement to reform Commonwealth-State 
funding arrangements. 
The new Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial 
Relations, agreed in November 2008, shifts the focus of the 
Commonwealth–State funding relationship from inputs and 
processes to the achievement of mutually agreed outcomes. 
The framework established by the new agreement allows States 
and Territories greater flexibility in how they deliver services 
and manage their budgets. The framework also provides 
incentives for States and Territories to invest in reform, thereby 
encouraging innovation and healthy policy competition. The 
result should be improved government performance and better 
services for the Australian community. 
The collaboration taking place through COAG demonstrates 
the importance of the States and Territories in delivering high 
quality public services across Australia and shows great promise 
for the future. This is complemented by State and Territory 
action through the Council for the Australian Federation (CAF). 
Through CAF, State and Territory governments have initiated 
significant reform and championed new, positive thinking about 
the prospects for cooperative federalism in Australia.
In April 2007, CAF released Australia’s Federal Future by Anne 
Twomey and Glen Withers. This paper dispelled many common 
misconceptions about federalism. The authors drew on 
international comparisons and political and economic analysis 
to identify a range of benefits that flow from federal systems, 
including:
•	 checks	and	balances	on	power	in	order	to	protect	the	




Twomey and Withers concluded that the essential debate 
should not be about whether federalism works, but how we can 











 − facilitate cooperative legislative schemes; 
 − provide a role for the States and Territories in appointing 
High Court judges; and




A new era of cooperative federalism has begun in Australia. 
This era offers an ideal and rare opportunity to make lasting 
improvements in the functioning of our federal system in a way 
that delivers greater efficiencies and better services. Australian 
governments should seize the moment and take advantage of 
this mood for change, uniting in the common cause of building a 
modern cooperative federation that can deliver effective national 
responses to national challenges and generate substantial benefits 
for all Australians.
The current receptiveness to cooperative federalism provides 
Australia’s governments with the chance to take action to 
improve the functioning of the Australian Federation. Common 
cause: Strengthening Australia’s cooperative federalism takes this 
window of opportunity to build on the work of Twomey and 
Withers and propose a framework for practical reform that 
should make federalism work more effectively. 
Productive intergovernmental cooperation is central to 
improved national policy performance. Accordingly, the options 
for reform outlined in this paper are directed at enhancing 
the functioning of the federation with a view to improving 
outcomes for all Australians. These options provide a broad 
platform for taking further action to improve the operations 
and effectiveness of the Australian Federation.
This paper argues that effective federalism requires an 
architecture of cooperation consisting of three interrelated 
components:
1. Principles to guide cooperative federalism
2. Supporting legal and institutional arrangements
3. Appropriate cultural practices and attitudes.
The relationship between these three elements and the overall 
objective of the paper is summarised in the accompanying 
diagram.
The three components of cooperative federalism examined 
in this paper point to several areas that could be the focus of 
change and where further reforms have the potential to achieve 
significant improvements in the effectiveness of the Australian 
Federation. Options for reform include:
•	 development	of	a	strategic	forward	agenda	by	CAF	to	
facilitate horizontal cooperation, share policy innovation and 
identify opportunities for harmonisation;
•	 formalisation	of	COAG	and	its	operation	through	an	
intergovernmental agreement that articulates principles to 
guide cooperation;
•	 clarification	of	the	relationship	between	COAG	and	
Ministerial Councils, with the latter undertaking greater 
community engagement;
•	 establishment	of	innovative	and	purpose-built	institutions	
where reform needs require them;
•	 ongoing	review	of	federal	financial	relations.
4
All Australian governments – federal, state and local – share a responsibility to make our federal system work effectively for the 
benefit of all Australians.
COMPONENTS OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM





A commitment to supporting the 
best practice principles of:
•	 	Subsidiarity	–	proximity	of	
government to the community
•	 	Alignment	of	responsibilities	
– the allocation of roles and 
responsibilities to the level 




cooperation between the levels 
of government, including the 
comity principle
A commitment to developing new 
inter-jurisdictional institutions 
and an improved cooperative 
federalism architecture:
•	 	Legal	mechanisms	to	facilitate	
cooperation – including referral 
of powers, ‘mirror’ legislation 
and complementary legislation 
to harmonise laws
•	 	Institutional	and	administrative	
arrangements to facilitate 
horizontal cooperation 
(between States and Territories) 
and vertical cooperation 
(between States, Territories and 
the Commonwealth)
A commitment to improving 
processes and realigning 
organisational cultures to improve 
cooperative federalism:
•	 	Removing	barriers	to	
cooperation – including 
allegiances, loyalties and 




up’ systems and programs to 
tackle complex and cross-
sectoral problems, improve 
integrated service delivery 
and set common goals and 
objectives
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agenda to facilitate horizontal 
cooperation, including identifying 
opportunities to harmonise laws 
and to share policy innovation 
and best practice initiatives
•	 	COAG	and	its	operations	
should be formalised through an 
Intergovernmental Agreement
•	 	The	relationship	between	
COAG and Ministerial Councils 
should be clarified, with the 
latter undertaking greater 
community engagement
•	 	Governments	should	give	
consideration to establishing 
innovative, purpose-built bodies 
where required to drive reforms
•	 	The	five	year	review	of	the	IGA	
on Federal Financial Relations 
should consider how to provide 
better and more transparent 
resource deployment within the 
Federation
•	 	The	Commonwealth	should	
work with the States and 
Territories to consider and 
propose constitutional reform 
to promote cooperative 
federalism, including facilitating 
cooperative legislative schemes, 
providing a role for the States 
and Territories in appointing 
High Court judges and giving 
States and Territories the 
opportunity to initiate referenda
•	 	State	and	Territory	governments	
should explore various ways to 
develop and sustain cooperative 
and collaborative cultural 
practices
•	 	CAF	should	consider	
undertaking a project to identify 
current successful collaborative 
cultural practices and to 
develop best-practice models 
and/or guidelines for such 
practices
BENEFITS OF REFORM
Checking the concentration of power at any level of government
Providing greater choice and flexibility for citizens, provide greater diversity of policy provisions and allow greater 
customisation of policy to suit local needs
Allowing greater scope for innovation in implementation strategies and delivery systems
Encouraging competition between jurisdictions in the provision of quality services and policy provisions
Enhancing creativity and innovation among governments and policy delivery networks.
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1. A NEW ERA BEGINS
A promising new era of cooperative federalism has 
begun in Australia. Governments at all levels have 
committed to work together to achieve shared 
goals and improved outcomes. This mood for change 
and climate of cooperation offers an excellent 
opportunity to make lasting improvements in the 
functioning of our federal system in a way that 
delivers greater efficiencies and better services. 
Australian governments should seize this moment.
1.1 A mood for change
After its election in 2007, the new Commonwealth government 
committed to renew federalism by working cooperatively 
and collaboratively with all Australian jurisdictions. For their 
part, the States and Territories have committed to working in 
partnership with the Commonwealth and with each other as 
equal jurisdictions. Importantly, this new constellation of political 
interests recognises the importance of intergovernmental 
cooperation in delivering quality public services across this vast 
country.
Across Australia, there is widespread recognition of the need to 
improve the way our federal system functions. This recognition 
comes not only from governments but from business groups, 
the community sector and the wider community. They, and 
others, rightly insist that Australia needs to harness the benefits 
of the federal system more effectively – not for its own sake, 
but to ensure the country’s future prosperity and well-being. 
There appears to be a shared commitment to move away from 
the negative ‘buck passing’ of old, and the ‘blame game’ politics 
that bedevilled policymaking. In recent times, the preference 
is for adopting approaches that will improve outcomes for all 
Australians. In place of rivalry, there appears to be a growing 
awareness that real policy outcomes are enhanced most 
effectively when governments work together to achieve 
common objectives.
In short, there is a mood for change and a desire to make 
federalism work better.
1.2  An ambitious new agenda
Australia’s large land-mass, remote locations, disparate regional 
areas and localised preferences mean that a federal system 
of government is suited to the Australian context. However, 
recent decisions by the Council for the Australian Federation 
(CAF) and the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
have highlighted the need for further reform to the architecture 
of our federal system. Both these bodies have committed to 
delivering an ambitious cooperative federalism agenda
For example, cooperation between the States and Territories 
was evident in their establishment of the National Emissions 
Trading Taskforce in 2004, which was influential in shaping 
BACKGROUND TO THIS PAPER
The Council for the Australian Federation was established 
in 2006 to support and enhance Australia’s federal system 
by providing an intergovernmental forum for State and 
Territory leaders in Australia. Each State and Territory 
Premier or Chief Minister is a member of CAF and the 
current Chair is the Queensland Premier, Anna Bligh.
The Council commissioned this paper to identify areas 
of the Australian Federation that are ripe for practical 
reform in the current context. This report builds on the 
recommendations of the CAF Federalist Paper, Australia’s 
Federal Future (2007) by Anne Twomey and Glenn Withers. 
In particular, it addresses the paper’s recommendation 
that “improvements [be] made in the arrangements and 
mechanisms for inter-governmental cooperation”.
Australia’s Federal Future challenged many misconceptions 
about federalism, providing a much-needed corrective on 
the importance of federalism to Australia’s future. 
Common Cause aims to further this debate by identifying 
areas where institutional and cultural reforms could 
be undertaken to give effect to some of the findings of 
Twomey and Withers.
The report has been developed based on a mixture 
of qualitative document analysis; interviews with State 
and Territory officials regarding their experiences 
with harmonisation and cooperation; and analysis of 
relevant initiatives and arrangements of federal systems 
internationally.
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the national debate and subsequent national policy initiatives 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Similarly, through the 
formation of CAF, the States and Territories have embarked 
on significant initiatives to deliver improved community 
outcomes through harmonisation and ‘horizontal’ cooperation 
in important areas such as the national school curriculum. These 
and other initiatives are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
In 2006, COAG’s agreement to the National Reform Agenda 
(NRA) explicitly recognised the need for a new model of 
cooperation to advance the urgent reforms required to 
increase national productivity and workforce participation. The 
NRA centered on competition, continuing the NCP reforms of 
the 1990s; reform of regulation to reduce unnecessary burdens 
on business; and reforms related to human capital, improving 
health, education and workforce participation. This culminated 
in the 2008 COAG Reform Agenda, which drew upon State 
and Commonwealth expertise and initiatives in the pursuit 
of shared goals and programs. The COAG Reform Agenda 
built upon the NRA by seeking to boost productivity, increase 
workforce participation and mobility and deliver better services 
to the community. The reform agenda also contributes to the 
broader goals of social inclusion, closing the gap on Indigenous 
disadvantage and environmental sustainability. 
The new Commonwealth–State financial framework agreed in 
November 2008 provides a solid and realistic platform from 
which improvements can be made in the delivery of services 
to the Australian public and upon which further reforms can 
be based to make Australian federalism work better. Figure 1 
summarises the most important features of the new financial 
framework (explored in more detail in Appendix 1).
One of the key features of the new framework is the COAG 
Reform Council (CRC), which is independent of individual 
governments. The CRC monitors and publicly reports on the 
reforms agreed by COAG and assesses whether performance 
benchmarks have been achieved.
This ambitious new reform agenda represents a significant step 
forward in cooperative federalism. Nevertheless, there is still 
considerable room for further improvement and reform to 
harness the benefits of Australia’s federal system.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL RELATIONS
Five new National Agreements National Partnerships
NP Projects
Shared investment in 




to facilitate and reward 
reform
•	 	Specific	purpose	payments	rationalised	 
from 92 to 5
•	 Focused	on	broad	core	service	areas
•	 	Based	on	statements	of	shared	objectives.	States	and	
Territories are able to pursue their own policy initiatives 
in order to achieve agreed objectives
•	 Controls	on	inputs	removed
•	 	New	streamlined	performance	reporting	will	provide	
better information on achievement of outcomes
•	 	Funding	is	ongoing	and	subject	to	review	rather	than	fixed	
term agreements
FIGURE 1: INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL RELATIONS
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1.3  The dynamics of reform
These developments highlight two significant and interrelated 
reform dynamics operating in Australian public policy today.
The first dynamic is centred on a substantive policy reform 
agenda aimed at deepening the economic benefits gained from 
the market-inspired and microeconomic reforms of the 1980s 
and 1990s, and extending them to include a broader focus 
on human capital. In addition, important environmental issues 
relating to water and climate change are now central to national 
policy discussions at COAG.
The second dynamic is focused on the operations and 
functioning of the federation itself and exhibits a new 
commitment to cooperative federalism. As COAG stated in 
December 2007, a ‘new model of cooperation’ is in prospect 
for Australian federalism.1 The November 2008 federal financial 
framework is the most obvious and significant expression 
of this. The fact that much of the agenda for reform of the 
federal system – as well as the specifics of many of the reforms 
– emanated from the States and Territories only serves to 
highlight the benefits of a cooperative federalist approach.
Perhaps the greatest potential of these two current reform 
dynamics lies in their intersection. The new COAG Reform 
Agenda recognises that national policy performance cannot be 
substantially improved without productive intergovernmental 
cooperation. Effective intergovernmental cooperation requires:
•	 	Principles to guide cooperative federalism. Chapter 
2 explores three key principles of good federal practice to 
guide thinking about what each level of government does best 
– its roles and responsibilities – and how governments work 
together.
•	 	Supporting legal and institutional arrangements. 
Chapter 3 outlines a number of possible avenues for 
improving the governance mechanisms of our federal system 
involving legal, institutional and constitutional change.
•	  Appropriate cultural practices and attitudes. Chapter 
4 examines how our organisational cultures can be realigned 
in order to support cooperative federalism. 
Addressing the new set of substantive policy matters facing 
Australia requires a framework that can harness the benefits 
of our federal structure. This framework includes principles 
to guide cooperation between Australian jurisdictions that are 
then backed by institutional and cultural arrangements. Such a 
framework will allow governments to better meet the needs of 
all Australians, now and in the future. 
1 Council of Australian Governments (2007) COAG Communique, 20 December, p. 1
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A robust, effective framework for cooperative 
federalism requires clear guiding principles. While 
there is no single set of principles that defines 
federalism, either as an abstract model or as it is 
practised by the many federal nations worldwide, 
internationally-recognised principles of good federal 
design can be adopted to guide reform in Australia. 
2.1 Guiding principles
Federalism is about maintaining territorial differences within 
an overarching political system. Its principles reflect this 
orientation. Federalism seeks to provide the benefits of unity 
without sacrificing the advantages of local autonomy, community 
choice and diversity within a nation. It allows different 
governments to offer different policy mixes or types of services 
to match local needs and preferences. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the intersection between the two 
reform dynamics – substantial policy reform and reforming the 
institutional structures of federalism – presents the greatest 
opportunity to improve the operation of Australia’s federation. 
Effectively harnessing this potential will require a shared 
commitment to the following principles:
•	 Subsidiarity: proximity of government to the community
•	 	Alignment of responsibilities: the allocation of roles 
and responsibilities to the level of government with the 
corresponding geographical scale (also referred to as the 
logic of assignment)
•	 	Cooperation: engagement and cooperation between the 
levels of government, including the comity principle.
Subsidiarity provides the fundamental rationale of federalism; 
however, it is less informative about how functions should 
be arranged between the levels of government in a federal 
system. The logic of assignment of responsibilities provides the 
basis for arranging functions, however, in the modern world 
there are few policy areas where clear lines of division can 
be drawn. This gives the third principle, that of cooperation, 
a particular significance. While each of these principles is 
explored below, the reality is that modern conditions of 
overlapping responsibility increasingly place a premium on 
effective engagement and cooperation between national and 
sub-national levels of government in federal systems. This 
need for engagement and cooperation has received the least 
attention to date and is the ripest for change in the current 
climate of Australian intergovernmental relations. The principle 
of cooperation provides the basis for the institutional and 
constitutional reforms discussed in Chapter 3 and is central 
to the improvement of collaborative practices discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
2.2  Subsidiarity and the notion of 
local responsiveness
The subsidiarity principle is a well documented driver of 
effective federations, the benefits of which were explored in 
some detail in the previous CAF paper Australia’s Federal Future.
The principle of subsidiarity is intrinsic to the efficient and 
effective allocation of responsibilities in a federal system. It 
is a means of ensuring that decision-making remains close to 
citizens and enables the system to be judged for whether it 
remains responsive to the needs of citizens.2
Traditionally, the very reason for federalism was to allow 
local communities to shape policies to meet their own 
local preferences. In economic terms, this allows for greater 
allocative efficiency because non-standard or differentiated 
provision is better calibrated across the country. In social terms, 
it means communities can choose the mixture of goods and 
services and the types of regulation that they prefer.
State and Territory governments, being closer to their 
communities, are best placed to represent those communities 
when engaging with the national level government and in 
consultations over national policy frameworks. The closer the 
proximity of government to the community, the more authentic 
the notion of representative democracy becomes. 
Subsidiarity encourages retention of control at the sub-
national level unless there are clear reasons to do otherwise. 
For instance, federal systems typically leave responsibility for 
schooling to the sub-national jurisdiction (State or even local 
governments), which allows both greater diversity of experience 
and more direct accountability. There are also a number of 
policy areas where there is no consensus on what constitutes 
the best approach to a given problem. In these cases, Gary 
Banks of the Productivity Commission has argued that we are 
collectively better off if alternative approaches are allowed to 
‘compete’ against each other. Banks argues that to maximise 
the benefits from federalism, we need to allow diversity to 
flourish, but we also need to ensure that we have good data for 
assessing results.3
2   Observation 28, “Federalism and the role of the states: comparisons and recommendations” , Federal-State Relations Committee, Parliament of Victoria. Available online: 
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/fsrc/report3/body/chapter6.htm
3   Gary Banks (2005) ‘Comparing school systems across Australia’, Address to the ANZSOG Conference ‘Schooling in the 21st Century: Unlocking Human Potential’, 29-29 
September, Sydney. Available online at: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/7657/cs20050928.pdf
2.  KEY PRINCIPLES FOR MODERN 
FEDERAL SYSTEMS
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The Commonwealth and the States and Territories could 
harness this potential by considering methods of collaboration 
that facilitate citizen assessment of the way their respective 
governments are serving them. An example can be found in the 
EU’s ‘Open Method of Co-ordination’. The open method rests 
on mechanisms such as guidelines and indicators, benchmarking 
and sharing of best practices. The method works in specific 
stages. First, the Council of Ministers agrees on very broad 
policy goals. Secondly, Member States then transpose these into 
national and regional policies. Thirdly, specific benchmarks and 
indicators to measure best practice are agreed upon. Finally, 
results are monitored and evaluated. The EU’s application 
of the open method of coordination has resulted in new or 
strengthened networks of national policy makers, synthesis of a 
detailed evidence base on national policies in selected areas and 
peer-review/mutual learning around this evidence base. In some 
instances, specific recommendations to either Member States 
or the community have been made or concrete deliverables in 
the form of policy guidelines or handbooks produced.4
Subsidiarity provides a powerful rationale for federalism and 
the retention of significant policy making and service delivery 
functions by the constituent units of a federation. However, it 
tells us less about which kinds of functions should be executed 
by those jurisdictions. For that, it is necessary to look closer at 
the theory of assignment of responsibilities.
2.3  The alignment of responsibilities 
with jurisdictional boundaries
COAG has agreed to consider the roles and responsibilities 
for funding and service delivery between governments over 
the coming year. In undertaking this work, COAG aims to 
“deliver more integrated and responsive services for individuals 
and families, to clarify accountabilities between governments 
and to improve performance of service systems”.5 This work 
recognises that the operation of the federation could be 
improved through better planned decisions about the allocation 
of roles and responsibilities. The logic of assignment principle 
can be used by governments to guide decision-making in this 
regard.
The alignment of responsibilities principle holds that 
responsibility for undertaking a particular government activity 
should lie with the level of government whose boundaries the 
geographical scope of that activity most closely approximates.6
This is because the effects of a particular policy, law or service 
which extend beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction 
exercising authority are unlikely to be taken into account by 
the responsible government. The effects of the activity that 
extend beyond the jurisdiction of the government involved are 
called ‘spillovers’. Undesirable (‘negative’) spillovers need to be 
curtailed and desirable (‘positive’) spillovers encouraged.
The most obvious spillovers in Australia are physical in nature 
and negative in effect – for example, pollution controls and 
transport infrastructure. However, spillovers may also be 
economic or regulatory in nature. Some regulations, such as 
those that impose barriers to mobility or the operation of 
national businesses, are a source of negative spillovers for the 
country as a whole. The national scope of business makes a 
‘seamless national economy’ an important aim of modern 
federalism. Divergent State and Territory regulation in areas 
such as occupational health and safety are creating negative 
economic spillovers while providing little useful or appreciated 
policy diversity. Recognising this, all Australian governments have 
agreed to a schedule to reduce such irregularities.
‘Factor mobility’ is another reason for the alignment of 
responsibilities with jurisdictional boundaries. Jurisdictions 
with policies that potentially impose burdens on business, 
investors, or high earning individuals may well be subject to 
‘exit threats’ meaning that these highly mobile actors will move 
to a jurisdiction with more preferential regulatory settings. 
Such threats, implicit or otherwise, limit the decisions that the 
member governments of a federation can make about how 
they regulate. This is widely regarded as being one of the main 
reasons why so much taxing power in federations has ended up 
in the hands of central governments.7
Applying the principle of the alignment of responsibilities with 
jurisdictional boundaries would support extensive regulatory 
harmonisation to remove the barriers to trade imposed 
by inconsistent State and Territory regulation. However, 
Australia should not seek consistency for consistency’s sake: 
federations should harmonise where there are demonstrable 
economic benefits, not simply for the sake of removing minor 
inconveniences, as the costs may outweigh the benefits.
Similarly, economies of scale are highly relevant to the 
undertaking of alignment of responsibilities. Often it will make 
sense to have one regulator. For instance, in relation to food 
standards, little would be gained from having a diversity of 
standards across Australia and having eight different offices 
4   “Application of the open method of coordination in favour of the Barcelona research investment objective: The Second Cycle”, European Union Scientific and Technical 
Research Committee, Brussels, 5 September 2006. Available online: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st01/st01206.en06.pdf
5  Council of Australian Governments (2008) COAG Communique, 29 November, p. 4
6   Albert Breton (1965) ‘A Theory of Government Grants’, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 31:2; Mancur Olson (1969) ‘The Principle of “Fiscal Equivalence”: 
the division of responsibilities between different levels of government’, American Economic Review 59:2
7  See Alan Fenna (2008) ‘Commonwealth Fiscal Power and Australian Federalism’, University of New South Wales Law Journal 31:2.
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undertaking the same scientific evidence-based risk analysis 
would be highly inefficient. 
Accordingly, the alignment of responsibilities principle holds 






COAG’s recent focus on reforming the funding of essential 
public services relative to responsibilities has made some 
progress toward improving the alignment of responsibilities 
with jurisdictional boundaries.8
Considerable scope for improvement exists; however, the 
reality is that modern conditions make a clean division of 
roles and responsibilities extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
Many government functions with an impact that once was 
merely local now have much wider impacts, making a much 
more coordinated or national approach necessary.9 Modern 
federalism involves a high level of engagement between levels 
of government to achieve effective economic integration and 
policy coordination.
2.4  Engagement and collaboration 
between levels of government
There are many international examples of how federal systems 
engender cooperation that are instructive in the Australian 
context. 
Federalism works best when each level of government conducts 
itself in a way that respects the others’ place in the system and 
the others’ responsibilities. In Germany, this principle has been 
officially recognised by the Federal Constitutional Court as the 
‘comity’ principle (Bundestreue).10 The federal comity principle 
requires governments in Germany to take the legitimate 
concerns and interests of other governments into account in 
their decision-making, to negotiate in good faith and to engage 
in cooperation. In the German system, a greater share of policy 
making occurs at the national level, but in return, the States 
have both greater input into that decision making and a greater 
role in its implementation.  
Elaborating on this philosophy, the new South African 
constitution includes a direct comity clause headed ‘cooperative 
government’. This requires each sphere of government to 
‘respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and 
functions of government in other spheres; not assume any 
power or function except those conferred on them ... exercise 
their powers ... in a manner that does not encroach on the 
geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government 
in another sphere; and cooperate with one another in mutual 
trust and good faith....’. 11
Implementation of something like the federal comity principle 
in Australia requires a combination of administrative and 
cultural changes to enhance the relationship between levels 
of government. The Australian federation was designed on the 
assumption that the levels of government would operate with a 
high degree of independence (called ‘coordinate federalism’) and 
thus made little provision for integration of policy making and 
implementation between the Commonwealth and the States. 
Adaptations have been made over time, with the emergence 
of COAG being the most salient example; however, further 
improvements could be pursued to enhance and ensure 
enduring engagement and cooperation. In the past, stakeholders 
have expressed dissatisfaction with the level of cooperation 
between governments and have called for deeper and more 
durable engagement. 
Cooperation needs to be based on reciprocal relations, with 
each level of government working together. This is the principle 
enshrined in the Canadian ‘Social Union Framework’ signed 
between the various governments of Canada in 1999.12 This 
example is discussed further in Chapter 3 (section 3.1.2). A 
commitment to effective engagement and cooperation between 
the levels of government should be formally articulated by all 
Australian governments (also discussed further in Chapter 3).
8  The Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations (Schedule E) recognises the role of the Commonwealth Government in funding reforms in areas of state 
or territory responsibility where reforms would have ‘spillover’ benefits.
9  Alan Fenna (2007) ‘The Malaise of Federalism: comparative reflections on Commonwealth–State relations’, Australian Journal of Public Administration 66:3
10 Grounded in Article 20(1) of the Fundamental Law, declaring that ‘The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state’
11 Section 41(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
12  A Framework to Improve the Social Union for Canadians. For example, the framework commits the Government of Canada not to introduce any new national programs 
‘without the agreement of a majority of provincial governments’.
12
2.5 Applying the principles
The interplay between the three principles outlined above 
is a constantly oscillating dynamic rather than a static rule-
book. These principles suggest a balance between competing 
federal imperatives: the imperative to address national needs 
versus local needs; the imperative to work toward greater 
harmonisation versus greater diversity and choice and the 
imperative of jurisdictions to cooperate versus to compete. 
Governments should consider these principles in future 
determinations of roles and responsibilities. In some cases, this 
may involve determining a degree of exclusivity and separation 
of responsibilities; in other instances of shared responsibilities, 
it may involve determining which level of government should 
take primary responsibility (lead jurisdiction roles); in still other 
areas, it may result in decisions to retain shared responsibilities 
but with clearer functional roles. 
Modern realities mean that there will be many areas where two 
or three levels of government have a legitimate role to play. 
Complex policy areas will often require ‘joined up’ solutions 
requiring cooperation between several levels of government 
and various non-government actors. In these areas, the focus 
should be how actors within a system can work together to 
create ‘seamless’ service systems. This reality demonstrates the 
important inter-relationship between the three principles.
Inherent in the three principles are a number of interwoven 
concepts and policy objectives that would also support effective 
engagement and cooperation between levels of government and 





cooperation requires ongoing commitment and sustained 
attention)
•	 Acknowledging	the	diversity	and	respect	for	the	












These three principles can be used as a guide for developing 
reforms that will drive more productive intergovernmental 
cooperation to improve service delivery; however, institutions 
and mechanisms to facilitate cooperative federalism are 
necessary for their practical implementation. The legal, 
constitutional and institutional reforms that could give effect to 
these principles are explored in the following chapter.
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Australia has a rich tradition of pragmatic 
arrangements enabling governments to work 
together horizontally and vertically. These 
arrangements, sometimes called the ‘gossamer 
strands’ that tie the federation together, have 
broadened and deepened over the years.13 
There is scope to reform this ‘architecture’ of  
legal, institutional and administrative mechanisms  
to sustain and advance cooperative federalism. 
3.1  Institutional and administrative 
cooperation
Intergovernmental cooperation in Australia occurs both 
horizontally and vertically through a range of mechanisms. In 
practice, many of these mechanisms work in tandem and are 
inter-dependent. 
3.1.1 Horizontal cooperation
The States and Territories have worked hard in recent years to 
deliver positive community outcomes and lead community and 
policy debate through horizontal cooperation in several policy 
areas of national significance. For example: 
•	 States	and	Territories	were	instrumental	in	shaping	
the national debate on emissions trading through the 
establishment of a National Emissions Trading Taskforce in 
2004. This initiative pre-dated the creation of CAF, but was 
catalytic in spurring States and Territories to cooperate 
horizontally. Subsequently, CAF engaged Professor Ross 
Garnaut to review the impacts of climate change on the 
economy and to recommend policies and policy frameworks, 
which culminated in the publication of the Garnaut Report 
and the Commonwealth Government’s Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme initiative.
•	 In	2003,	all	jurisdictions	except	Queensland	signed	an	
Inter-State Investment Cooperation Agreement aimed at 
eliminating ‘bidding wars’ between governments for business 
investment.
•	 The	States	took	the	lead	to	establish	the	Australia	and	New	
Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) in 2002–03, 
preparing a business plan, scoping the teaching model and 
customising the curriculum before the national government 
joined the initiative.
•	 All	State	and	Territory	governments,	along	with	the	
government of New Zealand, formed the Australian–New 
Zealand Biotech Alliance in 2004 to promote collaborative 
research and development and business development in 
biotechnology. 
An important milestone in cooperative federalism occurred in 
October 2006 with the establishment of the Council for the 
Australian Federation (CAF), consisting of the Premiers and 
Chief Ministers of the States and Territories. 
The need for such a body had been identified on a number of 
occasions, 14 and similar institutions exist in Canada (Council of 
the Federation) and the USA (National Governors Association). 
While the Leaders Forums set up during the early 1990s 
were influential, they were dominated by the agenda of the 
Special Premiers’ Conferences (later COAG), had no formal 
bureaucratic support, and eventually became restricted to 
relatively brief tactical meetings between leaders immediately 
prior to COAG meetings.15 By contrast, CAF provides a regular 
opportunity for State and Territory leaders to discuss matters 
related not only to COAG but, just as importantly, to horizontal, 
cross-jurisdictional issues in which the Commonwealth may 
have a minor role or even no role. Such issues can have a 
significant impact on the lives of many Australian individuals, 
families and businesses. CAF also provides a public platform 
to communicate broader issues of public interest, including 
discussion about Australia’s federal system.
Reducing and harmonising regulation has been a particular 
priority recently for States and Territories and has been pursued 
through COAG and CAF in areas not requiring Commonwealth 
involvement.16 For example, through CAF, States and Territories 
have: 
•	 agreed	on	common	dates	for	daylight	saving	periods	in	five	
jurisdictions and agreed on harmonised arrangements for the 
provision of the ANZAC Day public holiday across Australia;
•	 commenced	an	examination	of	national	standards	to	ease	the	
introduction of electric and low emission vehicles; and
13 John Warhurst (1983) ‘Central Agencies, Intergovernmental Managers and Australian Federal-State Relations’. ANU: Canberra
14  John Bannon (1992) ‘Cooperative Federalism: Good Policy and Good Government’, Federalism Research Centre, ANU: Canberra; Wayne Goss (1995) ‘Restoring the 
Balance: the future of the Australian federation’, Federalism Research
Centre, ANU: Canberra; Federal–State Relations Committee (Victoria) (1998) ‘Australian Federalism and the Role of the States’, Parliament of Victoria, Melbourne
15 Anne Tiernan (2008) ‘The Council for the Australian Federation: a new structure of Australian federalism’, Australian Journal of Public Administration 67:2
16  Harmonisation of regulations has been going on for some time in Australia. For example, a National Food Authority replaced State-based systems in 1991 – the culmination 
of a long process of engagement between industry, the States and the Commonwealth. Harmonisation took a substantial step forward with the implementation of National 
Competition Policy (NCP) in the mid-1990s as a continuation of that positive-sum ‘new federalism’. 




regulatory burden on the not-for-profit sector.
CAF has also been instrumental in several initiatives that 
have been ultimately finalised through the COAG Business, 
Competition and Regulation Working Group. These include:
•	 Signing	an	Intergovernmental	Agreement	committing	
to harmonise key areas of workers compensation and 
occupational health and safety, as well as reducing the 
regulatory burden by providing employers with easy access 
to streamlined information on legislative and other matters 
related to workers compensation
•	 Signing	a	ministerial	declaration	to	remove	impediments	to	
the movement of skilled workers across borders through the 
mutual recognition of 22 occupational licenses in six priority 
trades areas
•	 Harmonising	payroll	tax	systems	(excluding	tax	rates	and	
thresholds) in NSW, Victoria, Tasmania and the ACT.
CAF has also played a key role in the move towards a national 
school curriculum – a good example of horizontal cooperation 
aimed at harmonisation. CAF’s policy recommendations detailed 
in its paper The Future of Australian Schooling (2007) helped to 
shape the Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for 
Young Australians. Made by all Australian Education Ministers, 
the Declaration sets the direction for Australian schooling 
for the next 10 years. The Future of Australian Schooling report 
provided the basis for the extensive consultation that led to 
the development of the Declaration. The outcomes framework 
articulated by the report is also reflected in the new National 
Education Agreement agreed by COAG in 2008. 
There is no doubt that horizontal cooperation has enhanced 
Australian federalism and that the establishment of CAF is 
a positive signal that such cooperation will be ongoing. The 
challenge now is to strike an appropriate balance between 
promoting harmonisation by removing unnecessary ‘nuisance’ 
differences and maintaining the virtues of locally-tailored 
policies and practices. Leadership from CAF will be important 
in achieving this balance, as well as ensuring State and Territory 
views are heard in the national debate.
As outlined in the Twomey and Withers paper, another strength 
of federalism is the opportunity to experiment and innovate. 
States and Territories provide a laboratory in which ideas can 
be tested on a smaller scale before being implemented across 
the country. CAF recently published on its website a policy 
exchange entitled Climate Change: Best Practices by State and 
Territory Governments in Australia. The document was compiled by 
State and Territory jurisdictions on behalf of CAF to showcase 
current best practice initiatives. It was designed to promote 
collaboration and information sharing across jurisdictions.
Successful horizontal cooperation is not only about 
harmonisation. It also improves policy development and 
innovation by facilitating the exchange of ideas and ‘what works 
best’ by jurisdictions working on similar policy problems. 
It can also play an important secondary role by providing a 
regular forum for States and Territories to share, collaborate 
and cooperate. This forum of equals leads to the further 
development of collaborative cultures throughout States 
and Territories. This key theme is explored in more detail in 
Chapter 4.
3.1.2 Vertical cooperation
In areas where cooperative federalism cannot be achieved 
by the States and Territories alone, COAG is a key 
intergovernmental institution for Commonwealth–State vertical 
cooperation. In 2008, COAG committed to an ambitious 
reform agenda facilitated by a more cooperative approach to 
intergovernmental relations. Appendix 1 highlights COAG’s 
recent achievements. 
Central to these new reforms is the new Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Federal Financial Relations. This new financial 
framework aims to improve accountability through simpler, 
standardised and more transparent public performance 
reporting for all jurisdictions, underpinned by clearer roles 
and responsibilities. Schedule E of the Agreement sets out 
principles to guide areas in which the Commonwealth may 
provide support for national reform or service delivery 
improvements through National Partnerships. In this manner, 
the Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations 
goes some way towards articulating how governments interact 
with one another with regard to implementation, reporting and 
monitoring. 
OPTIONS FOR REFORM
The Council for the Australian Federation should 
develop a strategic forward agenda to facilitate horizontal 
cooperation. This agenda should identify opportunities 
for harmonisation of laws, as well as opportunities to 
share policy innovation and best practice initiatives. This 
will help to embed improvements in collaborative culture 
throughout States and Territories.
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However, there is still an absence of guidance as to how 
governments work with each other in the negotiation 
phase. At present, COAG is an administrative entity of the 
Commonwealth. The Commonwealth is able to command, defer 
or cancel meetings, set agendas and prioritise policy issues. 
If COAG is to represent a genuine partnership between the 
States and Territories and the Commonwealth, measures must 
be put in place to give it a more multi-lateral and collaborative 
character. To be more effective, governments need to be equal 
partners, particularly in their ability to set agendas and prioritise 
policy issues.
Formalising COAG’s governance arrangements 
Canada has introduced a Framework to Improve the Social 
Union for Canadians, negotiated and agreed between the federal 
and provincial governments in 1999. The Framework commits 
both levels of government to protocols of collaboration over 
any Canada-wide policy or financing initiatives. The Framework 
covers the policy fields of health and health care, education and 
social assistance. It also includes provisions for the Government 
of Canada to provide prior warning about funding changes (one 
year minimum). The Framework also enshrines principles of 
subsidiarity: in circumstances where the Federal Government 
and any six provinces can agree on policy objectives or new 
programs, they can proceed with each province working out 
the details and criteria of its own program. This provides a way 
of receiving federal funds for provincial-initiated programs in a 
spirit of cooperative federalism. 
The establishment of an intergovernmental agreement that 
commits all Australian governments to a set of governing 
protocols, such as the Canadian Framework, would provide a 
clear and agreed foundation for more effective cooperation. 
To enable COAG to perform to its maximum potential, it would 
be advisable to set down some rules.17 An intergovernmental 
agreement could specify COAG’s governance arrangements, 
rules of engagement and meeting protocols, and could be 
preceded by a statement committing the parties to the 
principles of cooperative federalism. The new Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Federal Financial Relations could be included in 
the legislation or agreement formally establishing COAG. 
The formalisation of COAG’s governance arrangements also 
provides an opportunity to clarify COAG’s strategic role. It 
should be clarified that COAG’s principal role is focused on 
strategic medium- to long-term policy directions. COAG is 
uniquely placed to consider such strategic issues and then 
leave the details of implementation and administration to 
other intergovernmental bodies or participating governments. 
COAG should collectively determine the allocation of roles and 
responsibilities as these decisions require the leadership of First 
Ministers. An intergovernmental agreement could also set out 
COAG’s oversight of and policy relationship with Ministerial 
Councils.
Other governance and procedural rules could further enhance 
the value of COAG. For example, States and Territories 
should have a role in setting COAG’s agenda. This would allow 
States and Territories a greater opportunity to pursue issues 
of State and Territory importance through COAG where 
Commonwealth engagement is necessary. 
COAG’s effectiveness would also be improved by the 
establishment of an independent secretariat and administrative 
support staff reporting to the COAG members as a whole, 
similar to the arrangements for CAF. This would certainly be 
required if the responsibility for chairing COAG meetings 
was rotated between the Commonwealth and the States and 
Territories. Currently, the COAG Secretariat is located within 
the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
Performance reporting
As intergovernmental relations and institutions deepen and 
expand, several functions need to be performed on an ongoing 
basis in order to improve cooperation, promote transparency 
and yardstick competition. 
The COAG Reform Council (CRC) has an important role in 
this regard. It has been tasked under the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Federal Financial Relations to:
•	 compile	and	publish	performance	information	for	all	
jurisdictions against the outcomes and performance 
benchmarks contained in the National Agreements and some 
National Partnership Agreements; 
•	 independently	assess	whether	predetermined	performance	
benchmarks have been achieved before an incentive payment 
to reward nationally significant reforms under National 
Partnerships is made; and
•	 monitor	the	aggregate	pace	of	activity	in	progressing	COAG’s	
agreed reform agenda. 
17  Similar proposals for COAG have been made by the Victorian Premier. See John Brumby (2008) ‘Making Federalism Work’ Keynote address to ANZSOG Annual 
Conference, Melbourne, 11 September, to be published in John Wanna (ed.) (2009) Critical Reflections on Australian Public Policy, ANU E-Press, Canberra; http://www.premier.
vic.gov.au/index.php?option=com_mymedia&Itemid=51&lang=en&media_id=324&task=text
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Although the role of the CRC has already been established 
by the new Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal 
Financial Relations, reiterating its role and functions in an 
Intergovernmental Agreement would give the CRC greater 
institutional durability. As with COAG, the institutional basis of 
the CRC is currently informal. Its long-term effectiveness would 
benefit from the certainty provided by having its governance, 
roles and functions articulated in an intergovernmental 
agreement. In this regard, COAG should review the CRC with a 
view to giving it a permanent and formal institutional basis.
Ministerial Councils 
Ministerial Councils are another key intergovernmental 
institution. Consisting of ministers and supporting officials, these 
councils facilitate inter-jurisdictional cooperation in specific 
policy sectors,  They operate under guidelines and protocols 
established by COAG. At its meeting in April 2009, COAG 
agreed to review Ministerial Councils (to be completed by 
November 2009); this provides an opportunity to re-assess how 
these bodies operate and interface with COAG in order to 
further promote cooperative federalism.  
OPTIONS FOR REFORM
COAG, as Australia’s peak intergovernmental forum, 
should have its own Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA). 
The IGA should:
•	 	Articulate	principles	to	guide	the	functioning	of	
cooperative federalism in Australia (such as those 
identified in Chapter 2)
•	 	Propose	cooperative	protocols	to	govern	the	conduct	
and prosecution of intergovernmental relations
•	 	Outline	governance	arrangements	regarding	COAG’s	








COAG and Ministerial Councils should consider clarifying 
their respective responsibilities and streamlining their 
linkages in order to improve their efficiency. In particular, 
Ministerial Councils should undertake increased 
stakeholder engagement where appropriate.
Intergovernmental efficiencies could be achieved by 
strengthening and streamlining the linkages between COAG 
and Ministerial Councils. COAG should remain focused on 
matters of strategic importance, tasking Ministerial Councils to 
complement this work by dealing with issues of policy-detail, 
implementation of COAG agreements and other policy sector 
concerns.  
Ministerial Councils or their sub-committees could also be 
opened up to include representatives of stakeholders and end-
users being present at the meetings and engaged in deliberative 
processes. Ministerial Councils are important, influential and 
high-level forums capable of weighing stakeholder views, making 
decisions accordingly and feeding relevant stakeholder input to 
COAG processes. Adopting more open and inclusive processes 
would incorporate a ‘community cabinet’ aspect into the 
business of Ministerial Councils, with stakeholders representing 
wider community interests. Such involvement would assist 
governments with cultural change issues and reinforce 
collaborative cultures. 
Generally, Australian governments should take the 
opportunity to directly incorporate other participants into 
the intergovernmental policy processes, such as industry 
and community representatives. This would give effect to 
the principle of subsidiarity through encouraging local input, 
engagement and participation in decision-making. 
COAG would need to forge stronger, more cooperative 
relationships with other Ministerial Councils in order to 
facilitate this ‘top down/bottom up’ approach to policy 
development. 
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CASE STUDY: AUSTRALIAN 
NATIONAL TRAINING  
AUTHORITY (ANTA)
Established by the Australian National Training and Authority 
Act 1992 (Cth), ANTA was a statutory authority given the 
mission of establishing a consistent national Vocational 
Education and Training (VET) system. The States and 
Territories formally recognised the national leadership 
role of ANTA through their own legislation, which 
established their own VET systems as the ‘State Training 
Agency’ under the ANTA agreement.
ANTA was a tri-partite body consisting of the 
Commonwealth, the States and Territories and industry. 
Recognising the importance of orientating reform to 
industry needs, the ANTA board consisted entirely of 
industry advocates. In formal terms, ANTA reported to 
the Commonwealth minister; however, in practice, it 
reported to a Ministerial Council of Commonwealth, State 
and Territory ministers. 
ANTA was a successful catalyst for change because 
there was a clear and articulated need for major reform. 
ANTA benefited from a strong sense of commitment 
among the various government and industry players, 
building a ‘wow’ factor around the initiative. As a new 
agency, ANTA fostered a sense of excitement supported 
by innovation and a ‘can-do’ culture, especially in the 
early years. As a policy body without direct responsibility 
for implementation, ANTA had to work at developing 
relationships with its partners responsible for 
implementation. It could not assume a command-and-
control position over the sector and had no ‘big stick’. 
It had to work at initiating, coordinating and mediating 
between different jurisdictions and institutional agendas.
ANTA achieved considerable progress in developing and 
overseeing a national training system. The framework was 
devised and implemented generally in accordance with the 
original charter.
OPTIONS FOR REFORM
Governments should be prepared to invest in innovative, 
purpose-built institutions or bodies where circumstances 
suggest that the COAG or Ministerial Council structure is 
not the best means for progressing reform proposals.
Other Institutions for national reform 
One of the key challenges for governments working 
together has been the limitations of the architecture of 
government in facilitating collaboration. The establishment 
of functional institutions is one such challenge. Examples of 
intergovernmental institutions include bodies such as Ministerial 
Councils and the recent COAG Working Groups that operate 
without legislative basis. Other bodies, established to facilitate 
national reform have been creatures of statute, such as the 
Australian National Training Authority (ANTA). The structure, 
powers and functions of these bodies may be more suited 
to some purposes than others. ANTA is an example of an 
institution that was designed and established to drive reform in 
a particular sector. 
The key lessons to be draw from the ANTA example are:
•	 Funding – Sufficient financial resources need to be made 
available to support the implementation of major reforms. 
Key to ANTA’s success was its power to direct and approve 
funding.
•	 Policy reform agenda – Federal bodies established to drive 
reform need to have a clearly defined policy agenda.  
•	 Cooperative design – Federal bodies need to be designed 
to facilitate cooperation (discussed further in Chapter 
4). In the ANTA case, having non-government leadership 
was important in mediating Commonwealth and State and 
Territory interests to achieve shared objectives for sector 
reform. 
The broader lesson for governments is that they must 
be flexible and prepared to invest in innovative, purpose-
built institutions where the need arises. The structure and 
governance of COAG and Ministerial Councils may not always 
be the most effective way of achieving reform. This is evident in 
the ANTA example where industry leadership was an important 
factor to achieving sector reform. 
The establishment of the COAG Working Groups is another 
example of the success of purpose-built bodies or institutions. 
The Working Groups were set up with a clear mandate to 
undertake policy development and reform in the delivery of the 
COAG Reform Agenda. 
Going forward, major policy reforms could be pursued through 
specially established bodies that are purpose-driven, purpose-
designed and time-limited. 
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3.2  Legal mechanisms to facilitate 
cooperation 
The realities of Australian federalism mean that the COAG, 
CAF, Ministerial Councils and other multi-jurisdictional 
institutions need effective legal mechanisms to implement 
cooperative reform. 
However, it should be noted that many forms of horizontal and 
vertical cooperation do not require formal legal mechanisms 
to be effective. For example, the Melbourne Declaration on 
Educational Goals for Young Australians establishes a high level 
policy framework and commits all Australian governments to 
working towards shared goals. The Declaration, which effectively 
sets the broad direction for Australian schooling over the next 
decade, is based on mutually agreed aspirations and does not 
require any formal mechanisms to proceed.
Where legal mechanisms are necessary to facilitate cooperation, 
options range from achieving loose consistency through 
State and Territory cooperation to complete centralisation 
via referral of powers to the Commonwealth. Table 1 lists 
several legal mechanisms that can be used to promote greater 
consistency and cooperation, while still enabling all participating 
governments to have input on aspects of policy decision-making 
and discretion.17 Each of these options has a place in our 
modern federation. 
At the devolved end of the spectrum, ‘mirror’ legislative 
schemes allow States and Territories some discretion for 
variability. Mirror or model legislation involves each State and 
Territory passing separately a law that is enacted in similar 
terms to other jurisdictions. Model legislation may include core 
and non-core provisions. These sorts of legislative schemes are 
most suited to cases in which less than total harmonisation is 
desirable to enable some flexibility in local responses without 
imposing disproportionate costs on those participating in the 
system. 
A good example of where mirror legislative schemes can be 
effective is in the regulation of criminal and civil offences and 
court procedures. In the interests of equality, it makes sense for 
all jurisdictions to have reasonably similar legislative provisions 
so that all Australian citizens are held to the same standards. 
However, some jurisdictional diversity can be tolerated because 
these differences do not impose costs for those involved in the 
system. This is because offences are never prosecuted in more 
than one jurisdiction – hence, there are limited ‘spillovers’.
An alternative path is to implement a ‘complementary applied 
laws’ scheme (sometimes referred to as ‘uniform legislation’).19 
This method involves one jurisdiction, ‘the host’, enacting 
legislation to establish the scheme. Other jurisdictions then 
pass legislation giving that law force in their jurisdictions. The 
advantage of this method is that jurisdictions cannot make 
unilateral changes to the legislation as amendments must be 
passed in the host jurisdiction. 
Such legislative approaches enable the States and Territories to 
achieve harmonisation by working together. Through effective 
cooperation, States and Territories are able to maintain an active 
policy role as well as direct responsibility for the administration 
of these statutes. These approaches link the principle of 
subsidiarity to notions of consistency and harmony. 
For this reason, multi-lateral approaches to harmonisation 
are preferable to unilateral Commonwealth action in areas 
not conferred on the Commonwealth Parliament by the 
Constitution. Multi-lateral legislative approaches are more in 
keeping with the comity principle discussed in Chapter 2 and 
overcome negative regulatory ‘spillovers’ without sacrificing the 
subsidiarity principle.
However, there are limitations to such schemes. One key 
limitation is lack of an effective system for the conferral or 
‘cross-vesting’ of jurisdiction with regard to the cooperative 
scheme in a single court system. This means that while States 
and Territories may have identical statutory provisions, the 
interpretation of those provisions by State and Territory courts 
(who are not bound to follow the decisions of the courts of 
another State or Territory) may result in divergent application 
of the legislation. For this reason, uniform national legislation 
may be preferred due to its effectiveness in achieving total 
harmonisation, interpreted by a single (federal) court system. 
In the 1999 case of Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally, the High 
Court of Australia held that legislation that purports to confer 
State jurisdiction on a federal court is unconstitutional and 
therefore invalid.  Accordingly, constitutional reform would be 
required to institute an effective cross-vesting system.20
18  The contents of Table 1 summarise much of the analysis contained in Anne Twomey (2007) ‘Federalism and the Use of Cooperative Mechanisms to Improve Infrastructure 
Provision in Australia’, Public Policy 2:3
19  Parliamentary Counsel’s Committee (2008) Protocol on Drafting National Uniform Legislation, Third Edition, p.2, available at: http://www.pcc.gov.au/uniform/
uniformdraftingprotocol4-print-complete.pdf 
20 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 163 ALR 270
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Amendments to the Constitution would ensure that multi-
lateral approaches to harmonisation could be just as effective as 
unilateral ones, while maintaining respect for State and Territory 
autonomy. Amendments might include:
•	 establishing	an	effective	cross-vesting	system	in	which	
State jurisdiction can be vested in federal courts, with the 
agreement of both the Commonwealth and the States 
concerned; and
•	 permitting	one	level	of	government	to	confer	powers	and	
obligations on the officers of another level of government, if 
both governments agree, so that a single body could enforce 
cooperative schemes.
OPTIONS FOR REFORM
The Commonwealth should work with the States and 
Territories to consider and propose constitutional 
changes in order to facilitate multi-jurisdictional co-
operative legislative schemes such as complementary 
applied laws schemes.
20
21 Cheryl Saunders (2002) ‘Collaborative Federalism’, Australian Journal of Public Administration 61:2, p. 71
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF LEGAL MECHANISMS





‘matters’ to the 
Commonwealth 
under s.51 (xxxvii), 
which may then 
legislate in regard to 
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There is a need for 
uniform legislation 
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jurisdiction of the 
Commonwealth 21
Commonwealth Powers 
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3.3 Longer term options
This chapter has concentrated on examining the institutions 
and mechanisms that can promote cooperative federalism. 
It does not seek to look in detail at two areas that have 
traditionally dominated discussion on federalism reform – fiscal 
federalism and constitutional reform. This is partly due to the 
difficulty of achieving reform in these areas and partly because 
they have been the subject of much discussion and debate 
already. However, this section briefly discusses some limited 
possibilities for financial and constitutional reform from the 
perspective of promoting cooperative federalism in the longer 
term, noting that they require more extensive national debate 
and consideration.
3.3.1 Financial certainty
Given the extent of vertical fiscal imbalance that exists in 
Australia, the transfer of funding from the Commonwealth 
to the States and Territories to help meet service delivery 
and other needs is an important issue that has an impact on 
cooperative federalism.
The new financial framework agreed in November 2008 has the 
potential to reduce unproductive disputes through streamlining 
and reforming the administration of specific purpose payments. 
In essence, while the Commonwealth continues to raise the 
lion’s share of revenues within the Federation and the States 
and Territories remain responsible for the lion’s share of 
service delivery, States and Territories will seek more certainty 
over resource allocations. Consideration should be given 
to future guarantees of proportions of revenue as occurs 
in some other federations. This might include allocations or 
sharing of a specific Commonwealth revenue stream or tax 
base, and a review of how the current per capita distribution 
of SPP funding is operating. Providing mechanisms to ensure 
guaranteed funding sources will free jurisdictions at both levels 
to concentrate on effective service delivery and national policy 
agenda setting.
3.3.2 Constitutional change
Historical experience suggests that constitutional change in 
Australia is extremely difficult to achieve. However, there are 
two key constitutional issues impinging directly on the workings 
of Australian federalism that, in principle, could receive greater 
State and Territory input without the need for recourse 
to a referendum, and which would show that the spirit of 
cooperative federalism is active and strong. These issues are 
the appointment of High Court judges and the proposing of 
constitutional change. 
The High Court is the final arbiter on questions of federalism 
within Australia, yet its membership is decided solely by 
the executive government of the Commonwealth. The 
Commonwealth Government has expressed an interest in 
making the judicial appointment process more transparent 
and accountable. The Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee current inquiry into Australia’s judicial system 
specifically includes the procedure for appointment and method 
of termination of judges. The reporting date for this inquiry is 
17 August 2009. 
OPTIONS FOR REFORM
When the Ministerial Council for Federal Financial 
Relations undertakes its five yearly review of the funding 
adequacy under the Intergovernmental Agreement on 
Federal Financial Relations, consideration should be 
given to providing better and more transparent resource 
deployments within the Federation, including a review of 
funding formulas and consideration of a more substantial 
guaranteed revenue stream or tax base. 
OPTIONS FOR REFORM
COAG should review the key federal aspects of the 
Commonwealth Constitution, including appointments to 
the High Court.
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Constitutional change sits under the referendum provisions 
in section 128 of the constitution. The Commonwealth is 
exclusively empowered to propose changes to the constitution, 
with States and Territories excluded from the process. 
States and Territories should be consulted and be given the 
opportunity to put up proposals for consideration by the voters 
in a referendum. Such processes could be agreed through 
formal protocols. 
This chapter has noted several ways in which legal, institutional, 
fiscal, and constitutional mechanisms can support productive 
cooperation within our federal system. These mechanisms are 
one important element of an architecture that will improve the 
functioning of the Federation and, in turn, generate improved 
outcomes and services for all Australians. 
OPTIONS FOR REFORM
States and Territories should have the opportunity to 
initiate Constitutional amendment processes. This could 
involve:
•	 	Holding	State	and	Territory	indicative	referendums	on	
issues of national importance
•	 	The	Commonwealth	agreeing,	perhaps	through	
COAG, to submit to referendum State and Territory 





Effective cooperative federalism requires ongoing 
commitment to improving collaborative cultural 
practices across all jurisdictions. It also requires 
giving sustained attention to improving relationships 
between jurisdictions and within federal institutions. 
Improving the quality of these relationships requires 
an understanding of the areas in which cultural 
practices could be improved and possible strategies 
for cultural renewal. 
4.1 Current cultural practices
It is important to recognise that the existing cultures of 
governance can be strengths and weaknesses simultaneously. 
The strengths associated with dedicated organisational cultures 
can provide an administrative focus for an agency’s direct 
responsibilities, clarify policy carriage and offer clear lines of 
accountability for nominated responsibilities. The weaknesses 
can include an agency-centric insularity, a lack of innovation 
and experimentation, and an absence of incentives to work 
cooperatively with other bodies.
Cultural practices could be one of the most difficult aspects of 
Australia’s federal relations to reform. It cuts across existing 
organisational structures, their incentive systems and the career 
trajectories of public officials. Fostering collaborative cultural 
practices requires skills and techniques in public administration 
that are not always nurtured by existing organisations. 
A realignment of organisational cultures to improve cooperative 
federalism could focus on:
•	 Committing	to	develop	cooperative	philosophies	of	policy	
making and delivery to improve the outcomes for the 
community
•	 Recognising	the	inherent	shared	responsibilities	and	mutual	
inter-dependence involved in achieving those desired 
outcomes
•	 Developing	a	preparedness	to	step	back	from	some	of	
the ‘old norms’ of public administration such as ‘unilateral 
decision-making’, ‘claims of exclusive policy ownership or 
carriage’, ‘command and control’ logics and ‘we know best’ 
mindsets.
4.2 Barriers to cooperation
Although collaborative cultural practices are being applied 
in many pockets of government, some institutional barriers 
inhibit wide-spread moves towards a more cooperative 
style of governance. These barriers, or codes of insularity, 
occur principally within three interrelated dimensions of 
administration:
Jurisdictional allegiance and loyalty
Most actual policy-making and delivery operations are 
authorised and initiated within a single jurisdiction – even 
if ideas, policy requirements and resources may be derived 
from other levels of jurisdiction. Administrative and delivery 
cultures remain framed within the jurisdictional environment 
and its processes and procedures. There are a few notable 
exceptions of truly inter-jurisdictional agencies such as the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority or Food Standards 
Australia and New Zealand. Jurisdictional allegiance and 
loyalties tend to foster unnecessary insularity and lead to the 
compartmentalisation of policy issues or their implementation. 
This goes to the heart of Chapter 3: the need for truly 
cooperative inter-jurisdictional institutions.
Agency-based perspectives and vantage points
Most organisational cultures and administrative incentive 
structures remain risk averse. Silos and silo-mentalities can 
adversely affect collaborative engagement. The institutional walls 
that serve to protect the organisation and provide defensible 
structures for officials carrying out administrative duties within 
a single entity can impede cooperative partnerships. All forms of 
cooperation require different types of commitments and skills. 
All instances of collaboration involve hard work and dedication 
to establish and maintain. These requirements place additional 
burdens and responsibilities on the participating actors 
(government or non-government).
4.  CULTURAL PRACTICES FOR 
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
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Profession-based values, codes of practice and 
regulatory behaviours
Professions also work from internalised value systems that 
tend to proliferate professionally sanctioned norms and codes, 
which in many cases limit the practices or behaviours of 
service deliverers. The manifestation of such values and codes 
is often found in restrictive work or ‘work to rule’ practices 
enforced by professional entities and associations. Professions 
may not be antagonistic to cooperative interaction but their 
training and professional policies may limit meaningful sharing 
of responsibilities. Many professions also guard their own 
notions of individual practice and responsibility. In some cases, 
professional behaviours may limit information sharing and 
cooperative policy development with external stakeholders.
4.3 Building cooperative cultures
These barriers must be overcome, as cultural change is critical 
to excellence in government performance, particularly in a 
federal system, and to addressing complex and cross-sectoral 
policy problems.
For example, homelessness is one such problem that cannot be 
neatly disentangled to discrete State and Commonwealth roles. 
Homelessness has a number of contributing factors, including 
access to welfare payments (Commonwealth responsibility), 
education and training opportunities (State responsibility), 
health services (State responsibility) and crisis accommodation 
(States and community sector responsibility). These problems 
need genuine and effective inter-jurisdictional cooperation in 
order to ‘join up’ systems and ensure people do not fall through 
the gap between where Commonwealth services end and State 
services begin – and vice-versa. The role that local government 
and the community sector also play in these areas means 
cooperation is an involved and multi-dimensional task.
As Prime Minister Tony Blair argued in the UK, often the 
major areas of policy failure are the things that fall between 
existing policy programs. Blair argued for the need for ‘joined 
up government’, meaning resource-based incentives for 
multiple agencies to cooperate to solve community problems 
and improve integrated service delivery. The UK’s model was 
enhanced by the requirements for joint-bidding for resources 
in which agencies were required to collaborate in policy design 
and make joint submissions to government for funding. Australia 
has used variants of this previously (such as with Landcare or 
national heritage programs) but such schemes have been used 
relatively infrequently. 
Cooperative cultures require behavioural changes in areas 
where practices can be improved, but they also require the 
reorientation of public administration to encourage broad-
based change. The most significant changes required are those 
that:
•	 Build	relations	based	on	trust,	not	on	commercial	or	
contractual logics (which are premised on distrust, caution 
and even scepticism) or on commanded directives from  
one actor. The 2008 reforms to the federal financial  
relations framework is a positive move in this direction  
(see Appendix 1)
•	 Explore	ways	to	identify	and	embrace	common	goals	and	
objectives – building shared perceptions of problems using a 
‘top down/bottom up’ approach. In the COAG context, this 
would mean COAG can set the strategic direction, whilst 
Ministerial Councils provide the policy detail and act as 
facilitators of community input
•	 Develop	policy	solutions	closer	to	the	community	through	
community involvement and engagement
•	 Establish	new	organisational	skills	and	cultures	–	elevating	
the techniques of collaboration, working with other sectors, 
anticipation, diplomacy and relation-building
•	 Develop	and	promote	collaborative	career	cultures	and	
progression plans to broaden workplace capacities and 
profiles – highlighting the benefits of diverse experiences, 
working in different sectors, arranged staff secondments and 
sabbatical attachments, the development of multi-agency skills 
and networks
•	 Develop	joint	and	supportive	reporting	and	review	systems	
which enhance policy goals rather than adopt a ‘gotcha’ 
mentality. For example, the public reporting of government 
performance through the COAG Reform Council has a role 
to play in sharing best practice
•	 Reconsider	accountability	requirements	and	risk	assessments.	
Many cooperative ventures will require some relaxation of 
strict accountability requirements and some appreciation by 
parliaments (and the media) that these endeavours will be 
complex and multi-faceted and perhaps even ‘messy’. Agencies 
will remain reluctant to cooperate if they feel they are 
exposed in terms of formal accountabilities. 
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4.4 Towards cooperative practice




programs across governments for mutual learning and 
relationship building
•	 Joint	management	reviews	of	inter-dependent	policy	areas	
(such as the project management reviews undertaken by the 
‘Gateway Review’ methods)22 involving executive oversight 
with experienced managers
•	 Invitations	to	network	actors	and	community	representatives	
to join and participate in working groups for stipulated 
periods (perhaps with officials going to work in policy 
networks for similar periods)
•	 Greater	encouragement	of	lateral	recruitment	and	more	
diversified career planning, perhaps involving placements in 
the private sector, third sector, NGOs and other locations. 
This effort can be assisted by programs of sabbatical leave 
spent attached to other jurisdictions or delivery agents
•	 More	formal	recognition	of	cooperative	experience	and	
involvement in career promotion criteria in the public 
services.
 These changes focus on bringing the strength of difference 
and shared perspectives to the table in order to build the 
capacity for governments to think and lead together. The new 
Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations 
provides a framework in which State and Commonwealth 
Governments can pursue mutually agreed objectives. Indeed, 
the 2008 COAG process saw an increase in cooperation and 
information sharing between jurisdictions in the collaborative 
development of the policy frameworks for the new National 
Agreements and National Partnerships. Building stronger 
collaborative cultures will allow governments to fully harness 
the potential of the framework they have established. 
22  The Commonwealth has introduced the Gateway Review Process to improve the on-time and on-budget delivery of major projects. 
See: http://www.finance.gov.au/gateway/index.html
OPTIONS FOR REFORM
State and Territory governments should explore various 
ways to develop and sustain cooperative and collaborative 
cultural practices in the delivery of community outcomes.
To ‘kick start’ this process, the Council for the Australian 
Federation should consider undertaking a project to 
identify current successful collaborative cultural practices 
and to develop best-practice models and/or guidelines for 
such practices in Australia.
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Common Cause: Strengthening Australia’s cooperative 
federalism has built on the earlier work of 
Twomey and Withers by exploring how Australian 
jurisdictions can enhance policy delivery through 
improving engagement and cooperation. This report 
does not seek the perfection of federalism for 
its own sake or to satisfy some arcane principles 
in federalist theory; rather, it seeks to provide a 
framework for improving the workings of Australian 
federalism to generate and sustain substantial future 
benefits for the Australian community. The premise 
of this report is that substantive policy reform 
should occur hand in hand with the functional 
reform of the federal system in order to deliver real 
outcomes for Australians. 
To frame our arguments, we adopted a three-part architecture 
consisting of the principles of good federal design, suggestions 
for improving the governance arrangements within Australia, 
and broad proposals to improve the cultural alignment within 
the networks of policy delivery. The improvement of policy 
outcomes rests on these three interrelated elements of 
improved federal functioning, as shown below. 
The paper identified three main principles that underpin the 






Of these, cooperation between governments is undoubtedly the 
most important in the current Australian context. The options for 
reform put forward by this paper reflect its importance:
•	 Development	of	a	strategic	forward	agenda	by	CAF	to	facilitate	
horizontal cooperation, share policy innovation and identify 
opportunities for harmonisation
•	 Formalisation	of	COAG	and	its	operation	through	an	
intergovernmental agreement that articulates principles to guide 
cooperation
•	 Clarification	of	the	relationship	between	COAG	and	Ministerial	
Councils, with the latter undertaking greater community 
engagement
•	 Establishment	of	innovative	and	purpose-built	institutions	where	
reform needs require them
•	 Ongoing	review	of	federal	financial	relations
•	 Consideration	of	constitutional	reform	to:
 − facilitate cooperative legislative schemes; 
 −  provide a role for the States and Territories in appointing High 
Court judges; and
 −  give States and Territories the opportunity to initiate referenda 
•	 Development	of	cultural	practices	that	support	the	best	of	
federalism.
Undertaking these reforms should release the benefits of the 
Australian Federation. These benefits would:
•	 Check	the	concentration	of	power	at	any	level	of	government
•	 Provide	greater	choice	and	flexibility	for	citizens,	provide	greater	
diversity of policy provisions and allow greater customisation of 




quality services and policy provisions
•	 Enhance	creativity	and	innovation	among	governments	and	policy	
delivery networks.
To achieve these benefits, Australian governments need to commit 
to a new era of cooperative federalism and embed genuine 
collaboration across all stages of the policy process.  











The new COAG Reform Agenda recognises that substantially 
improved policy performance cannot occur without productive 
intergovernmental cooperation. 
As a starting point, COAG has deepened and extended its own 
role. At its meeting in December 2007, COAG committed to 
meet an unprecedented four times in 2008.23 It also expanded 
those attending to include Treasurers, thereby consolidating its 
place within the policy-setting process of each government. 
Also in December 2007, COAG established seven working 
groups. The groups were charged with developing strategic 
policy directions and outcomes frameworks contained in the 
new agreements.
The most significant of COAG’s decisions in 2008 was 
to implement the new Intergovernmental Agreement on 
Federal Financial Relations.24 In committing to the new 
Intergovernmental Agreement, governments recognised that 
a new framework for Commonwealth–State engagement was 
necessary in order to achieve significant and durable reforms. 
The new financial framework commenced on 1 January 2009. 
While COAG will oversee all aspects of the new agreements, 
independent monitoring and reporting of progress will be 
undertaken by the COAG Reform Council. 
This financial framework is based on five key elements:
1. Rationalisation of SPPs: specific purpose payments (SPPs) 
have long been a major source of inefficiency and inflexibility 
in Australian federalism. Under the new reform plan, the 90 or 
more current SPPs have been rationalised into five new SPPs 
supported by new national agreements in the areas of health; 
schools; skills; disabilities services; and affordable housing.
2. Greater flexibility: the Commonwealth has committed 
to removing the prescriptive conditions contained in SPPs 
which inhibited State and Territory service delivery and priority 
setting. The States and Territories now have greater flexibility 
to direct resources to areas they believe will produce the best 
results. The focus has shifted from inputs to the achievement 
of outcomes. Mutually agreed statements of objectives are 
contained in the National Agreement accompanying each SPP. 
These set out what governments expect to achieve, as well as 
clarifying roles and responsibilities of each level of government. 
Performance indicators, benchmarks and policy and reform 
directions are also contained in the National Agreements. 
3. Funding: funding under the new SPPs is ongoing, subject 
to periodic reviews. The Commonwealth guaranteed that no 
jurisdiction will be worse off in funding terms than they would 
be under current arrangements. In a significant departure, the 
SPP agreements and new National Partnership (NP) payments 
have been negotiated (and funding provided) as a single 
package and paid directly to the Treasury Departments of each 
jurisdiction (rather than to line agencies). This should reduce 
administrative costs and aims to encourage line agencies to 
focus on service delivery and policy development rather than 
on securing funding.
4. Accountability: performance accountability is the bedrock 
of the new framework, granting the States and Territories 
greater flexibility in policy and spending decisions, in return for 
open scrutiny of their performance. This is expected to drive 
good performance and innovation through the highlighting 
of outstanding examples of government services. The COAG 
Reform Council (CRC),25 which came into existence in 2007,26 
has been given a substantial role in this regard. The CRC will 
provide independent assessments of how jurisdictions are 
progressing against agreed performance benchmarks in the 
various policy areas. The CRC will report to COAG and publish 
its findings publicly.
5. National Partnership Payments: a new form of payment, 
NPs are now available to States and Territories, over and above 
existing funding through SPPs, to support specific projects and 
to facilitate and reward reform. The NPs are of three types:
•	 	First,	some	existing	payments	for	specific	purposes	
will become National Partnership project payments to 
support the delivery of specific projects — such as the 
Commonwealth’s financial contribution to the States through 
AusLink.
•	 	Second,	National	Partnership	facilitation	payments	may	be	
used to assist a State to undertake policy reform in an area of 
national priority. This recognises that the benefits of reforms 
initiated in the States and Territories are often shared by the 
Commonwealth.
•	 	Third,	National	Partnership	reward	payments	will	be	
provided to those States and Territories which deliver reform 
progress, as measured by the achievement of performance 
benchmarks. Achievement of benchmarks will be assessed by 
the independent COAG Reform Council in order to provide 
transparency and enhance accountability in the performance 
assessment process. Reward payments provide an incentive 
for States and Territories to take the initiative in investing in 
future reform. 
Chart 1 illustrates how the new financial framework fits 
together.
APPENDIX 1: RECENT COAG REFORMS
23 Council of Australian Governments (2007) COAG Communique, 20 December
24 Council of Australian Governments (2008) COAG Communique, 29 November
25 Council of Australian Governments (2006) COAG Communique, 10 February
26 Council of Australian Governments (2007) COAG Communique, 13 April
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CHART 1:  THE NEW FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK
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General revenue assistance provided to compensate the States and Territories for 
their exclusion from major tax bases and to be spent at their discretion. 27
GST
27  Distribution of these payments among States and Territories from GST collections is made in accordance with recommendations from the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission (i.e. horizontal fiscal equalisation)

